By John Trapasso
This book review was written by John Trapasso. He is a freshman at Lamar University in Beaumont, TX. During his free time, John enjoys studying theology and the philosophy of religion.
Yujin Nagasawa’s The Problem of Evil for Atheists seeks to transform the debate on the problem of evil by demonstrating that it poses a significant challenge to almost all worldviews—not just traditional theism. In addition, Nagasawa claims traditional theists are better equipped to deal with the problem than their competitors.
Part 1 begins with a systematic analysis of the problem of evil for traditional theists. Nagasawa shows the general “scheme” of the problem always consists of three essential variables: (I) God, (II) evil, and (III) an allegedly conflicting relationship between (I) and (II). Different versions of the problem of evil for theism can be created by tweaking variables (II) and (III). For (III), the “conflicting relationship” can be considered either as a logical inconsistency or as constituting strong evidence against (I). The former version is known as the logical problem of evil, and the latter is the evidential problem of evil. Variable (II) can be tweaked by focusing on either the nature, causes, victims, kinds, intensity, or extensity of evil, which results in new versions of the problem. After this, Nagasawa argues that the problem of evil is essentially a version of “the problem of axiological expectation mismatch.” That is, what one would expect the world to be like if a wholly good God existed does not appear to match reality. The problem of axiological expectation mismatch, however, can be created for worldviews other than traditional theism if one replaces variable (I) (God) with something else—and that is what he sets out to do for the rest of the book.
Part 2 deals with the problem of evil for pantheists in the first half and axiarchists in the latter. The problem for pantheists arises by modifying variable (I) (God) and replacing it with the thesis that “the world or all-inclusive unity is divine.” This results in a “divinity problem of evil,” as there is an apparent conflict between (I) the world or all-inclusive unity is divine and (II) evil of considerable quality and quantity is realized in the world. An axiological expectation mismatch occurs since one would not expect significant amounts of evil to be part of the world or all-inclusive unity if it is divine. Pantheist responses to the issue are then evaluated. The first is the “experiential response.” Pantheists are justified in believing the world is divine because they experience it as such. Nagasawa considers this response unsuccessful, as it merely provides the pantheist with experiential evidence for the world’s divinity, but it does not help to fill the significant axiological gap that the divinity problem of evil presents. Furthermore, if attributing the world to be divine is only done because one experiences it as such, then there is little difference between (naturalistic) pantheism and atheism, as an atheist can have similar experiences. The second response is a non-experiential approach—the greatness of the all-inclusive unity is, according to pantheism, due to its encompassment. The degree of the all-inclusive unity’s greatness, then, is determined by how much it encompasses, and it is divine since everything in existence is encompassed by it. This response, however, is inadequate. The all-inclusive unity cannot be sufficiently encompassing due to the spatiotemporal limitations of the universe, which make it only finite in size and thus in greatness. Additionally, the modal limitations it has mean that there are an infinite amount of possible larger, more encompassing universes. So, it cannot be the case that this universe is supremely great or the most fully encompassing possible unity. Traditional theists are then shown to have advantages over pantheists when dealing with the problem of evil. Since theists hold that God and the world are ontologically distinct, the divinity problem does not arise. In addition, theists can appeal to theodicies and skeptical theism while pantheists cannot, since human beings are a part of the all-inclusive unity, and there is no “grand scheme” that an infinite God may have that humans are epistemically limited in understanding. The final response considered is multiverse pantheism, which posits that there is a multiverse that encompasses all possible universes. Multiverse pantheism fares better than generic pantheism. Since there is an infinite number of universes that exist, the encompassment of the all-inclusive unity is infinite and therefore supremely great. Also, the evil that exists in this universe is because all possible universes are created, and multiverse pantheism is indifferent to human suffering. Unfortunately, multiverse pantheism faces a significant challenge that generic pantheism avoids—namely, the fact that if all possible universes exist, then every possible instance of evil and suffering exists as well. This results in the most extreme form of the problem of evil. To make matters worse, since all possible instances of evil and suffering exist, then they are part of the all-inclusive unity. This makes it morally difficult to believe that it could be divine. If a multiverse pantheist attempts to stipulate that only the overall good worlds are created, then the all-inclusive unity is no longer supremely good, as it could be more encompassing. Moreover, since the multiverse is not a significantly free agent like God, it has no mechanism to filter out evil universes from good ones.
The second section of Part 2 is the problem of evil for axiarchists. Axiarchism is a non-theistic view that claims that the “creatively effective ethical requirement” actualized the world because it is better that the world existed than not. The problem of evil for axiarchists is created by replacing variable (I) (God) with the creatively effective ethical requirement. An axiological expectation mismatch results due to the belief that a creatively effective ethical requirement actualized the world because it is better that the actual world exists than not. One would expect from this that there would be only good. Yet, a significant amount of evil and suffering exists. The first axiarchist response is to claim this world is the best possible world. Traditional theists can use this as well when dealing with the problem of evil. The main issue Nagasawa finds with this approach is that the notion of the actual world being the “best possible world” is unintuitive. Also, an axiarchist who maintains this is the best possible world loses the ability to use the problem of evil against theism, as God could not have created a better world. The second response available for the axiarchist is to claim all possible worlds, including the actual world, exist. This commits one to modal realism, which contradicts axiarchism. Since all possible worlds exist to the same extent the actual world does, then the creatively effective ethical requirement cannot filter out worlds that are not overall good. A third response is that the actual world is only a good world, not the best possible one. Axiarchists face difficulties here that theists do not face—if there is no best possible world and the ethical requirement can only create good worlds, then it cannot create. Unlike God, who is a significantly free agent, the ethical requirement does not have the ability to choose a certain overall good world over another. Furthermore, if there is a best possible world and this is not it, then the ethical requirement similarly would have been unable to pick between worlds. A fourth response claims that only all overall good worlds, including the actual one, exist. This faces similar challenges, as it seems there could always be better “good” worlds created. If so, then there is no way for the creatively effective ethical requirement to decide what worlds to actualize. Axiarchists can attempt to skirt the problem of evil entirely by rejecting human-centered values from axiarchism and accepting ananthropocentric purposivism. Humans are irrelevant to the ethical requirement; instead, non-human-centered features such as “beauty” and “mathematical elegance” matter. The solution solves the problem of axiological expectation mismatch, but it does so at the substantial cost of removing most of the advantages axiarchism provides, such as explaining the fine-tuning of the universe. The other attempt to save axiarchism involves positing that the creatively effective ethical requirement made God. In addition to making axiarchism itself unneeded, this move causes it to no longer be an alternative to traditional theism.
Part 3 is the problem of evil for atheists and non-theists. Nagasawa begins by introducing a version of the problem of evil called “systemic evil” and demonstrates the serious challenge it poses to traditional theism. Unlike other forms of evil, systemic evil focuses on the biological systems of natural selection and evolution, which necessitate pain and suffering and underlie all instances of evil that occur. Next, he attempts to neutralize the problem by developing a version that applies to atheists and non-theists. To accomplish this, the concept of “modest optimism” is introduced. The initial version is the claim that “the actual world is not a bad world.” He refines this thesis several times to increase the number of atheists and non-theists who accept it. The final version of modest optimism is the simple claim: “Overall and fundamentally, the environment in which we exist is not bad.” Traditional theism implies modest optimism, as the world is purported to be created by an omnipotent and wholly good God. Numerous other views, such as axiarchism (excluding ananthropocentric purposivism), Platonism, pantheism, and neutralism, also imply it. Nagasawa then cites numerous psychological studies that suggest most people, including victims of natural and moral evil, accept modest optimism as an outlook on life. In section 7.2, the variable (I) (God) is replaced with modest optimism, which causes a severe axiological expectation mismatch to result: Modest optimists believe that, overall and fundamentally, the environment in which we live (earth) is not bad. Taking systemic evil into consideration, however, puts this thesis into question—the existence of life is nomologically dependent upon natural selection and evolution, which underlie the suffering of all human and non-human animals. It seems, then, that our environment is overall and fundamentally bad—not merely axiologically neutral. This version of the problem of systemic evil arises for everyone who accepts modest optimism, including atheists and non-theists. An emotive element also compounds the issue: according to the existential gratitude thesis, which seems implied by modest optimism, “it is appropriate that we feel pleased about and grateful for our existence in the environment in which we live.” Most people accept this, including atheists such as Roland Aronson, Richard Dawkins, Greta Christina, and Masahiro Morioka. Finally, there is one more thesis modest optimism entails: “the hope thesis.” According to it, “it is appropriate that we feel hopeful about the prospects for our existence in the environment in which we live.” Unfortunately, given the existence of systemic evil, which nomologically necessitates pain and suffering for countless sentient creatures, it does not seem coherent to hope our environment will fundamentally improve in the future. Despite the formidable challenge systemic evil poses, traditional theists, Nagasawa maintains, enjoy advantages over atheists and non-theists in responding to it. He gives a painting analogy by asking the reader to imagine an abstract painting; positive things in our environment are yellow, and negative things in our environment are gray. Modest optimism holds that at least half of the painting is yellow, and half is gray. Systemic evil makes this assessment doubtful, but according to traditional theism, one can claim there is a supernatural yellow “layer” below the gray layer of paint. If this is true, then it seems our environment is not overall and fundamentally bad after all; thus, modest optimism is justified. Traditional theists also can put forth theodicies to strengthen their response. Since atheists and non-theists lack a supernaturalist ontology, they are restricted to the biological domain in responding to the problem. Atheists and non-theists can reject modest optimism by embracing pessimism—doing so is costly, however, as it commits one to widely rejected positions like anti-natalism.
Part 4 is the final section of the book and deals with the problem of impermanence for eastern atheists and non-theists. The problem of impermanence differs from the problem of evil in that it focuses on the temporariness and fragility that encompasses existence instead of the evil and suffering in life. It also functions as an alternate version of systemic evil, since impermanence similarly underlies our existence. In traditional Japanese literature, there are four responses to the problem: Hermitism, Hedonism, Indifferentism, and Transcendentalism. The first response, Hermitism, says that one should live in isolation to avoid the dangers posed by humans and natural disasters. Nagasawa deems this approach unsuccessful, as there are unique difficulties one faces when isolated from society, and it cannot provide a solution to the impermanence of existence. Hedonism is the second response—it claims that one should minimize worries in life and maximize pleasure. Hedonism fails for similar reasons as Hermitism—such a lifestyle also entails unique difficulties and does not provide a solution to the ephemeral nature of existence. The third response is Indifferentism, which holds that one should ignore the problem and live an ordinary life. Indifferentism is a coherent response to the problem; one simply accepts the way reality is and moves on, thus resolving the axiological expectation mismatch. However, it cannot function as a solution to the problem of impermanence, as it merely accepts the problem as insurmountable. The final response is Transcendentalism, which posits a permanent state of reality that exists beyond the material world. Transcendentalism, Nagasawa maintains, is the only potentially successful response to the problem of impermanence. Thus, the book’s final conclusion is that naturalists are at a significant disadvantage compared to supernaturalists when responding to the problem.
I thoroughly enjoyed The Problem of Evil for Atheists and would highly recommend it to anyone interested in the problem of evil. I also thank Dr. Nagasawa for his kind response over email when asked for clarifications about his arguments.
© Adam Lloyd Johnson and Convincing Proof.