By Adam Lloyd Johnson, Ph.D.
In God and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality, Mark Murphy critiques the two most well-known theistic theories of morality, natural law theory and divine command theory, and then presents a third view which he argues is superior. In this book he doesn’t argue for theism; rather, he assumes theism is true and then explores what sort of relationship, given theism, we should expect between God and morality. He also explains that he’s arguing with the assumption of perfect being theology, though that doesn’t seem to play a large role in his argument, with the following exception: based on his understanding of perfect being theology, sovereignty is a perfection and thus any explanation of morality must put God in the center. In other words, to maintain that there’s something that’s not explained by God is to say that God is not perfectly sovereign. He uses this idea to critique natural law theory in particular when he argues this theory doesn’t necessarily depend immediately on God’s existence.
Summary
In chapter one Murphy lays out his understanding of moral law as involving a relation between universals. This is similar to the universals account of the laws of nature, the position formulated by Tooley, Lewis, and Dretske. A law of nature, and correspondingly a law of morality, is not just a regularity but a relation between universals, the presence of which explains the regularity.
In chapter two he explains that the overall aim of the book is to show how facts about morality depend on facts about God. Moral facts do not seem to be self-explanatory nor brute. He argues that all moral facts, which he sometimes calls moral necessities, are best explained by some moral law. Therefore, the best way to argue for the theistic explanation of all moral facts is to argue for the theistic explanation of moral law. For moral law to be theistically explained means that facts about God play an important role in an account of why some set of properties morally necessitates a kind of agent response. Thus, a theistic explanation of morality should meet this “theistic immediacy.”
In chapter three he critiques natural law theory. According to standard natural law theory, each being’s good is determined by the kind of thing it is; for a particular being to be good is to fulfill or perfect its nature. Thus, standard natural law theory can explain morality without positing God since it’s all based on human nature. According to Murphy then, natural law fails when it comes to the criteria of “theistic immediacy.”
In chapter four Murphy critiques divine command theory. First, he notes that divine command theory is just one form of theistic voluntarism; some voluntarists base moral obligations on God’s commands, while other voluntarists base them on God’s intentions, and still other voluntarists base them on God’s will. He explained that he actually means to critique all forms of voluntarism, not just divine command theory. According to Murphy, Robert Adams’ divine command theory comes closest to being an acceptable theistic explanation of moral law since it is undeniably theocentric, as opposed to natural law. However, he concludes that even Adams’ voluntarism is paradoxical, perverse, and bizarre. Why does Murphy use such strong language? Consider that it is essential to voluntarism that non-moral, non-divine facts (for example, the human nature God created) cannot of themselves morally necessitate human action. Voluntarists claim we need divine commands, the divine will, or divine intentions in order to have moral obligations. However, somehow these non-moral, non-divine facts have the power to bind God to action (give Him moral obligations towards humans) but cannot of themselves morally necessitate human action (give humans moral obligations)! Thus, Murphy concludes, all forms of voluntarism are false accounts of moral necessitation.
In chapter five Murphy explains that the two dominant views concerning God’s relationship to the laws of nature (conservationism and occasionalism) are remarkably similar to the two dominant views concerning God’s relationship to the moral law (natural law and divine command theory, respectively). However, there is a third view concerning the relationship between God and the laws of nature (concurrentism), and Murphy uses that to develop a corresponding theory of the relationship between God and moral law. Concurrentism captures the immediate presence of divine action in every causal transaction while also including a genuine role for creaturely natures in those transactions. The action between God and creatures is not divisible into distinct actions, but rather they are concurrent and cooperate to bring about a given effect.
In chapter six he uses concurrentism to build a new theistic moral theory. Facts about God and facts about creaturely nature cooperate in fixing the character of creaturely goodness. Murphy starts with Adams’ theory, but only the first part of Adams’ theory, his explanation of moral value which proposes that to be good is to resemble God’s moral nature. He still rejects the second part of Adams’ model (that divine commands are what generate moral obligations) because, according to Murphy, that is perverse! Adams’ model needs revision, though; it is unacceptable as is. Instead of defining ‘good’ for a being (take a human being for example) as solely “resembling God’s moral nature,” it should be defined as the combination of “resembling God’s moral nature” and “according to the kind of thing the being is.” Standards of goodness are fixed to a certain degree by the kind of thing a being is. This model avoids his critique of standard natural law theory, namely, that it can easily leave God out of the picture. And it also avoids one of his critiques of voluntarism, namely, that it leaves creaturely natures out of the picture. Murphy struggles a bit with explaining moral obligation but thinks progress can be made toward a plausible account of obligation.
Strengths of the Book
The first strong point this book has going for it is Murphy’s critique of natural law theory. Natural law can easily push God off to the side. Yes, God is the one who created creaturely natures; however, I think it is a mistake to ground morality exclusively in human nature. Some of my Thomist friends, beginning from the position of natural law, conclude that God is not a moral being, that moral concepts do not even apply to God, which seems preposterous. Throughout my research for my book Divine Love Theory, I was trying to figure out what the absolute foundation of morality is, the foundation that is absolute and non-relative in every sense. Morality based solely on human nature is relative in the sense that it is relative to our human nature; if God would have created us with different natures, then morality would be different.
The second strong point of this book is that it argues that moral facts are not self-explanatory nor brute. Unfortunately, Murphy does not elaborate on this much, though. Regardless, this is an important point. It is odd to me that atheist Erik Wielenberg appeals to Murphy in his attack against William Lane Craig’s divine command theory. Wielenberg does this simply because Murphy agrees with him that divine command theory is a poor explanation of moral obligation. This is quite surprising to me considering that Murphy flat out rejects Wielenberg’s basic premise that moral facts are brute. Murphy has much more in common with Craig than he does with Wielenberg. Wielenberg seems to just be pointing out a problem with Craig’s position on moral obligation (divine command theory), a problem Murphy agrees with. However, Craig and Murphy agree on the larger issue that God is the ultimate foundation and explanation of moral value. That is what the major debate is about anyway, not divine command theory per se.
The third strong point is that Murphy humbly admits that moral obligation is difficult to explain. Since he so vehemently attacks divine command theory as an account of moral obligation, the reader expects that eventually he’d propose an alternative account of moral obligation. Instead, he admits it’s a difficult topic but hopes we can make progress on it in the future. This might seem like a weakness, and it is in a sense, but I’m noting it here as a strength in that he humbly admits he doesn’t have everything figured out yet.
Weaknesses of the Book
This allows me to segue nicely into this book’s first weakness, namely, Murphy’s bombastic ridiculing of divine command theory. Why did he feel the need to use such strong language to denounce this theory? Though I understand his concern, I believe his reaction is quite sensational and overblown. Why should the notion that “non-moral non-divine facts have the power to bind God to action (give Him moral obligations towards humans) but cannot of themselves morally necessitate human action (give us moral obligations)” be considered “perverse”? I see his concern that it might be paradoxical; however, I think he should have unpacked his concern a bit more. Maybe it’s only paradoxical on the surface, but underneath there are good reasons to affirm these two propositions. After all, as Murphy admits, it’s difficult to explain moral obligation—how it works, where it comes from, etc.
The second weakness has more to do with Murphy’s sensational style. Instead of lambasting natural law theory and divine command theory as foolish in order to propose his own theory, I’d encourage him to take a different approach by describing his solution as taking the best ideas that these older two theories had to offer. This is a more respectful way of treating those who have come before you—acknowledging their insights while noting their weaknesses and then combining the good insights from these two different camps to show how they can actually work together and compliment one another. This would be a more humble approach as opposed to promoting your own innovative ideas as the solution that previous thinkers failed to see.
The third weakness is that his proposed new solution really isn’t that new. After all his chapters where he belittles previous theistic moral theories and builds the reader’s anticipation that his new solution, when revealed, will be far superior, he begins his last chapter by admitting his solution is basically the first part of Robert Adams’ model, albeit with a supposedly new twist. However, this slight twist isn’t really new at all. Keep in mind that Adams’ model is twofold: (1) his theory of moral value is that goodness just is resembling God, and (2) his theory of moral obligations is that they’re generated by divine commands. Clearly Murphy rejects the second part, but Murphy announced that his moral concurrentism is simply the first part of Adams’ moral theory with the slight twist that, instead of defining ‘good’ for a being (take a human being for example) as solely “resembling God’s moral nature,” it should be defined as the combination of “resembling God’s moral nature” and “according to the kind of thing the being is.” However, Adams himself emphasized this nuance throughout his book Finite and Infinite Goods. For example, Adams noted often that “goodness is resembling God in a morally pertinent sense.” That Adams already incorporated what Murphy suggests is his own new added twist is most clearly seen by the fact that, when Murphy builds his argument for his supposed new twist, he quotes Adams to make his case for it.
© Adam Lloyd Johnson and Convincing Proof.