A Major Flaw in the Compatibilist Understanding of Freedom

The Lack of Source-hood

Introduction

Are we free to choose our own path or has it already been determined for us by something, or someone, else? For the early philosophers, the largest threat to free will was fate. Later in history, Christian theologians struggled to reconcile free will with God’s sovereignty (theistic determinism). Ever since the modern era, the attack on our free will has mostly come from scientific progress in genetics, neuroscience, and psychology (physical determinism).¹ Regardless of where the determinism comes from, the most perplexing question is: if everything in our lives has been determined, then how can we be held morally responsible for what we do? Some believe they can explain how determinism and moral responsibility are compatible by positing a particular notion of freedom. The purpose of this paper is to explain how the lack of source-hood is a major flaw in this compatibilistic understanding of freedom.

This will be shown by demonstrating two things: first, determinism eliminates source-hood, and second, source-hood is necessary for moral responsibility. If these two points are sufficiently established, we can thereby conclude that moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism. While gleaning insight from modern philosophers who mostly discuss free will in the context of physical determinism, the locus of this paper is specific to evangelical Christianity. Therefore, although theistic determinism will be the focus, the main thrust of this paper’s argument can be applied towards any form of determinism.² Before source-hood is discussed, there are two preliminary issues that must be addressed first in order to bring the dialogue into clearer focus. These two issues are first, the compatibilist model of sovereignty, and second, the distinction between soteriology and sovereignty when it comes to the problem of free will.

The Two Camps

The issues are more complex than one might think at first. Upon deeper inspection, some may soon wonder along with Alice how deep the rabbit hole actually goes. Therefore, it will be important to first define some important terms. It is often said that he who gets to define the terms will arise the victor. The purpose here is not to sway the reader into adopting one perspective over the other by coloring one with a sour definition. The goal is to define the important terms as objectively as possible in order to facilitate an honest and genuine dialogue.

Over the centuries philosophers and theologians have mostly found themselves in one of two camps concerning the issue of determinism and free will – libertarianism or compatibilism. Both positions agree that humans are morally responsible; we can be genuinely praised for our good choices and blamed for our evil ones. The positions diverge when it comes to what they believe is necessary for us to be morally responsible. Historically, libertarians held that to be morally responsible, we must have the ability to choose otherwise. Therefore they conclude that somehow God’s sovereignty works in such a way that we can still be ultimately in control of at least some of our choices.³

Alternatively, compatibilists are strong believers in theistic determinism; they understand God’s sovereignty to mean that nothing is under our ultimate control. Because they want to still maintain human responsibility though, they conclude that humans are somehow free enough to be held morally responsible even though nothing is under their ultimate control. They claim that the solution is to understand freedom to mean that we are able to do what we desire.     

Libertarianism, the position argued for in this paper, can be summarized as follows:

1. Sovereignty: God is in charge of all things but He does not cause all things. Libertarians deny theistic determinism.
2. Free will: historically libertarians have understood freedom to mean that humans have the power to choose otherwise; there are true alternative possibilities. They contend that only by having this notion of freedom can humans be held morally responsible.
3. Compatibility: human responsibility is not compatible with theistic determinism. If God truly determines everything, including human choices, then we could not be held morally responsible for our actions. This is why libertarians are sometimes called incompatibilists.

Similarly, compatibilism can be summarized as follows:

1. Sovereignty: God causes everything that happens, including human choices: theistic determinism. Helseth refers to this as God’s omnicausality.⁴
2. Free will: some deny free will outright while others use the term but define it differently than libertarians. They say that being free means being able to act according to your own desires. Either way, they firmly deny that humans have the ability to choose otherwise.
3. Compatibility: humans can still be held morally responsible for their actions even though God determines all things. This is why they are called compatibilists; they believe human responsibility is compatible with theistic determinism.

Peter van Ingwagen points out that technically, compatibilism is the position of holding that the libertarian definition of free will is compatible with determinism.⁵ Since so very few use the term compatibilism in that way, this paper follows the more common usage of compatibilism to mean that determinism is only compatible with moral responsibility, not a libertarian definition of free will. Robert Fischer is the leading philosophical defender of this position and to clarify, he refers to it as semi-compatibilism.⁶ For the purposes of this paper at least, compatibilism and semi-compatibilism are one and the same.  

Compatibilism takes a bit more explanation because, as those who hold it readily admit, on the surface their affirmations are not as readily intuitive as libertarians. Most compatibilists are Reformed in their theology and specifically Calvinistic in their soteriology. Accordingly, they hold a very strong view of God’s sovereignty. They have interpreted the Scriptures to teach that for God to be truly sovereign, He must be the cause of all things. This is why, in their theological system, they cannot allow humans the ability to choose otherwise; if they did then they believe God would not be truly sovereign. They correctly recognize though, that Scripture also teaches that God holds humans responsible for their moral choices. Compatibilists admit this appears to be a paradox and some of them maintain human responsibility simply as a matter of faith; they affirm it because Scripture teaches it but claim it is beyond our ability to understand. Those in this sub-camp do not try to explain how theistic determinism and human responsibility can both be true.

Other compatibilists do attempt an explanation. They maintain that humans can be held responsible for their choices as long as they are free from external coercion, free to act according to their own desires. Determinism simply means that there are conditions prior to an act that are sufficient to determine that action. Compatibilists maintain that our own desires are those sufficiently determining conditions; therefore, we can be held morally responsible for our actions. As long as what God determines is also what we choose because of our desires, then they believe God’s sovereign omni-causality can be held in conjunction with human responsibility.

Models of Sovereignty

Before the flaw in this compatibilist definition of freedom is addressed, it should be reiterated that the reason compatibilists posit such a definition is because of their initial stance on what it means for God to be sovereign. After they have inductively studied all the verses in the Bible about God’s sovereignty, they have concluded that the model which best fits this data is theistic determinism; God causes all things. They should be willing to admit though that this is only a possible interpretation of the biblical data. The Scriptures do not clearly spell out exactly what it means for God to be sovereign; nowhere does it say that God is the cause of all things.

John Feinberg says that Ephesians 1:11 is perhaps the clearest teaching on God’s sovereignty.

Clearly, this verse teaches the absolute sovereignty of God. Just as clearly, with such a notion of sovereignty, I see no room for indeterministic freedom. Given indeterministic freedom, God cannot guarantee that what he decides will be carried out. No matter how much God inclines someone’s will toward what he has chosen, such inclination, on an indeterministic account of freedom, can never be sufficient to produce God’s decreed action. Given indeterminism, I see no way for God to be in control of the world as outlined in Ephesians 1:11.⁷

Though Ephesians 1:11 states that God “works out everything in conformity with the purpose of His will”, Bruce Reichenback points out that “there is a critical ambiguity which Feinberg overlooks. Does the passage teach that God does or works out everything in conformity with his purposes, or does it teach that everything God does he does in conformity with his purposes? The grammar of the sentence does not force us to adopt one interpretation over the other.”⁸

The compatibilist position on sovereignty should not be faulted because it is based on a particular interpretation of the relevant Scriptures. They, like all theologians dealing with any subject, are trying to come up with the best system, or model, that best matches the data found in the Bible. Another option of course is to simply quote the Scriptures and leave it at that, without trying to explain things further. Often though it is worthwhile to do the work of a systematic theologian and develop a model or system that best explains all the relevant passages. The early church worked through this process concerning the Trinity and Christians ever since have been blessed by their attempt to clarify and articulate a systematic model of the Trinity.

Therefore, the compatibilist view of God’s sovereignty is not any less viable because it is based on a doctrinal system, one established by their interpretation of what the Bible says. Libertarians attempt the same thing; they try to develop a model that best matches up with all the applicable verses. The important thing is that both sides should humbly admit that their models are not inerrant. The author of this paper believes that compatibilists have misinterpreted the Scriptures when it comes to God’s sovereignty; it does not mean that He has to be the cause of all things. This incorrect interpretation here has led them down the wrong path and forced them into a position where they have to formulate a definition of human freedom that still entails human responsibility. In this paper it will be shown that their attempt at this ultimately fails. Instead of re-defining freedom, compatibilists should re-think their definition of sovereignty.  

Sovereignty versus Soteriology

It is important not to confuse the issue of sovereignty with the issue of soteriology in the context of free will. For example, to say that a fallen human cannot choose salvation on his own because of his total depravity is different than saying a human cannot choose salvation on his own because that would violate God’s sovereignty. We must treat the problem of free will and God’s sovereignty as separate and distinct from the problem of free will and the effects of the fall. Clearly the fall has affected all of us in tremendous and devastating ways but that is a separate topic than how created beings can have free will in light of a sovereign Creator.

It is instructive to note that some hold to a compatibilist view because they feel libertarian free will would result in a Pelagian view of soteriology. In fact, the very definition of freedom that compatibilists hold to, being able to choose according to your own desires, originated from Augustine in his soteriological debate with the Pelagians.⁹ These heretics argued that humans could not be held accountable for evil if they were not capable of also acting righteously on their own; they concluded then that everyone must be able to act righteously on their own. This is an issue of depravity, not sovereignty.

Augustine taught that Adam was truly free but that freedom was lost by all humans when Adam and Eve sinned.¹⁰ He did not think libertarian free will was impossible because of God’s sovereignty, he thought it was impossible because of the fall. The compatibilist notion of freedom did not originate with the intention of explaining moral responsibility in light of theistic determinism but to explain it in light of the fall. His point was that we can still be held morally responsible for our sin even though our fallen state prevents us from doing otherwise on our own. If Augustine established that people could be morally responsible even though they could not do otherwise because of the fall, would not that apply to sovereignty too? Not necessarily. Augustine was right that fallen humans cannot come to God on their own. Classic libertarians though, contend that humans still could do otherwise, just not on their own. They could turn to God through the empowering grace He freely offers.

As the reader can see, the issue of man’s fallen nature can greatly complicate the discussion. As in any experiment or model, in order to minimize confounding variables, it is instructive to discuss the problem of sovereignty and free will in terms of pre-fallen human beings. Therefore, it is best to address the issue in terms of Adam and Eve’s state before the fall. Of course, there may be applications to our fallen state from our understanding of sovereignty and free will as it relates to Adam and Eve. For example, if libertarian free will is found to be true for Adam and Eve, then it could not be said that a fallen sinner choosing to believe in Christ is a violation of God’s sovereignty. Whether or not it is a violation of total depravity is a topic beyond the scope of this paper.

Back to the Source

Libertarians have historically defined free will as the ability to do otherwise, to truly have alternative possibilities from which to choose. Many philosophers and theologians have begun to realize, though, that there is something even more primary to the libertarian notion of free will. While much of the dialogue in this debate still focuses on exactly what it means to be able to do otherwise, many libertarians and compatibilists are realizing that the heart of the issue is really source-hood.

Robert Kane argues that “if the case for incompatibility of free will and determinism cannot be made by reference to alternative possibilities alone, it can be made if ultimate responsibility (source-hood) is added. So, I suggest, the often-neglected condition of ultimate responsibility or UR should be moved to center stage in free will debates.”¹¹ Baker, a compatibilist, arguing that Frankfurt examples have decisively refuted the idea of alternative possibilities, puts that aside to “focus on the other libertarian intuition – one which, if correct, supersedes the principle of alternative possibilities anyway… The deeper libertarian intuition than the one codified in the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is that free agents are ultimate originators of their willings and actions.”¹²

Because compatibilists have such a strong view on sovereignty, they believe, according to compatibilist D.A. Carson, that “if human responsibility is made to depend on a definition of freedom that involves absolute power to contrary, then God becomes absolutely contingent.”¹³ Wanting to still maintain human responsibility though, they conclude that freedom is being able to choose according to our desires. This may sound plausible at first but when it is fully unpacked, it becomes clear that instead of establishing moral responsibility, in actuality they have only moved the problem back one step.

The key question that must be asked, then, is this: what is the source of these desires? Going back one step, from choices to desires, only establishes moral responsibility if humans are the ultimate source of those desires. If you define God’s sovereignty to mean that God must be the cause, or source, of all things, then He must be the cause of our desires too. This is exactly what compatibilists hold: “As long as his act is an expression of what he wants, then his action is free even if his wants are themselves determined… God would see to it that his creatures want to do what he has determined them to do.”¹⁴ Compatibilism maintains that “we are free to will whatever we desire even though our desires are themselves determined. Freedom is willing to act on your strongest preference. Libertarians claim that this notion of ability is really a sleight of hand and not adequate to give the freedom we need to be responsible agents. For libertarians, the real issue is not whether we are free to do what we want, but whether we are free to want in the first place.”¹⁵

This compatibilist notion of freedom does not satisfactorily account for moral responsibility “if our desires, character, and volition are themselves determined. As a matter of fact, we can imagine a case where we clearly would not be responsible. Suppose that we acted in accord with our desires and inner state, but that these states were in fact induced by hooking us up to some machine.”¹⁶ Theistic determinism, by very definition, says that nothing is under our ultimate control; if something were, then God would not be sovereign. Baker admits that the major disagreement is that libertarians believe “the agent must be the source or originator of the action in a way that precludes determinism.”¹⁷ In other words, theistic determinism eliminates source-hood.    

Baker even attempts to go back yet another step to try and locate moral responsibility in our approval of our desires, what she calls reflective endorsement. Yet in the end she admits that we do not have ultimate control over these endorsements either.¹⁸ No matter how many steps back you go, something somewhere must be under our ultimate control in order for us to be held morally responsible. Somehow, we must be the ultimate source of what we do, or we cannot be considered morally responsible. As Kane argues, “to have free will, it is necessary not only to be the ultimate source of one’s actions, but also to be the ultimate source of one’s will to perform the actions. It would not be enough for free will to be unhindered in the pursuit of one’s motives and purposes, if all of one’s motives and purposes were created by someone or something else.”¹⁹ If God is the source or cause of our desires, then it does not seem reasonable that He could then hold us morally accountable for them.

Is this akin to shaking my fist at God, to talking back to him? Do I fall under the rebuke of Rom. 9:20 here? No, it seems to me that in this context I am more like the guy who points out that God cannot lie to a group of people who say God lied and that it is morally acceptable that He did that because we cannot judge God; He is God and we are not. Well, in that scenario, I am not shaking my fist at God; I am pointing out that, based on what God Himself told us about Himself, He cannot lie. So it is not as though I think God lied and I am upset at God for that, it is that I think God cannot lie, based on what He has told us about Himself, and I am respectfully telling this group of people that I disagree with them when they say God told a lie and that it is morally acceptable for God to lie. My argument would be that no, God did not tell a lie, and one reason I would give them for my conclusion is that God Himself tells us He cannot tell a lie. That is not shaking my fist at God at all.

I believe I am in a similar situation with this issue. I am arguing that, based on what God has said about Himself in Scripture, He would not, even could not, much like He could not lie because of His moral nature, cause or give someone sinful desires and then hold that person morally accountable for those desires, or the resulting choices which compatibilists claim are determined by those desires. Certainly God can, and does according to Romans 9, harden our sinful desires to accomplish His plan and purposes, but that is completely different than God being the ultimate cause of our sinful desires. Nowhere in Scripture does it say that God is the ultimate cause of our sinful desires. Instead, it repeatedly teaches that we are the ultimate cause of our sinful desires. That is why it is part of the conclusion of this paper that we are the ultimate cause of our sinful desires. In fact, Scripture says that no one should say “‘I am being tempted by God’; for God cannot be tempted by evil, and He Himself does not tempt anyone. But each one is tempted when he is carried away and enticed by his own lust. Then when lust has conceived, it gives birth to sin; and when sin is accomplished, it brings forth death.  Do not be deceived, my beloved brethren. Every good thing given and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shifting shadow” (James 1:13-17).

Now of course I could be wrong. Maybe I have misinterpreted Scripture and in fact God can lie. If that is the case, then who am I to accuse God of doing something wrong? But based on my study of Scripture, it seems to me that lying is something God would not, and even could not, do, because of His moral nature. Similarly, based on my study of Scripture, it seems to me that holding someone morally accountable for sinful desires of which He is the ultimate cause of is something that God would not, and even could not, do because of His moral nature. But if I have misinterpreted Scripture on this issue and in fact God can do this, then who am I to accuse God of doing something wrong? In that respect I take the rebuke in Rom. 9:20 very seriously.

Meeting in the Middle

Some compatibilists seem open to the idea of humans being the ultimate source of their desires. John Feinberg may hold this but he is not crystal clear on the matter. His description seems to say that God is some sort of a global Frankfurt controller²⁰ that has the power to preclude alternative possibilities but never has to because our desires are always congruent with what God has decreed anyway.²¹ If a compatibilist would indeed grant that we are the ultimate source of our desires, then two things would follow. First, by granting this they would reject theistic determinism, which is the bedrock of their position. Second, they would be adopting a system much more akin to Molinism. In brief, Molinists understand sovereignty to mean that God placed everyone in their specific circumstances, based on His knowledge of how each one would use their libertarian free will in those circumstances, to accomplish His divine plan.

In fact, if a compatibilist would concede that humans are the ultimate source of their desires, then many libertarians would gladly welcome them over to their side. William Lane Craig explains how a case can be made that Molinism is virtually indistinguishable from this sort of compatibilism.²² Even some “libertarians have pointed out that one can reject the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, without rejecting libertarianism.”²³ In a strict sense, Molinism denies alternative possibilities in the moment. In Molinism, the future is inevitable; it is just that this inevitable future is based on libertarian free will choices God knew humans would make.

Conclusion

Most theologians understand God to be a libertarian free agent in that He is the ultimate source of His own choices and desires. Yes, He is limited by His holy nature in the sense that He cannot do evil, but even the classic understanding of libertarian free will, the ability to do otherwise, does not require that an agent have this ability for every decision. For God, surely it is the case that He has the freedom to choose between two alternative morally neutral options. Libertarians maintain that when God created us in His image, part of what this means is that, somehow, He also gave us the ability to be the source of our own desires and choices.²⁴ This in no way means He has lost control of the universe. Molinism, even if it is not true, at a minimum shows how it is possible that God is sovereignly in control while also allowing humans libertarian free will.  

Theistic determinism says that God must be the ultimate source and cause of everything; by definition it eliminates the human source-hood of our choices and desires. This is a serious problem because to be morally responsible, somehow the moral agent must be the ultimate source of his own choices and desires. Compatibilists find themselves then in a difficult corner, one they have been trying to get out of for centuries: if God is the ultimate source of all our choices and desires then ultimately He is the author of our evil.

This is such a serious charge that it should give every compatibilist reason to at least question their understanding. For if the libertarian is wrong, he has only understated God’s sovereignty, a major error to be sure. But if the compatibilist is wrong though, what he has done is far worse; he has insulted the very character of God. Scripture spends much more time explaining and defending God’s character than it does His sovereignty.

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Footnotes

[1] S.E. Frost Jr., Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 139-146.

[2] Determinism of any flavor simply means that there are conditions prior to an act that are sufficient to determine that action.

[3] It is my opinion that Molinism is the best explanation of how God can be sovereign and yet we can have libertarian freedom. 

[4] Paul Kjoss Helseth and Dennis W. Jowers, Four Views on Divine Providence (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 38.

[5] Peter van Inwagen, “How to Think about the Problem of Free Will,” Journal of Ethics 12, (August 2008): 329-330.

[6] John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manual Vargas, Four Views on Free Will (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 56.

[7] David Basinger and Randall Basinger, ed., Predestination & Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty & Human Freedom (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 30-31.

[8] Ibid., 52.

[9] Paul Kjoss Helseth and Dennis W. Jowers, Four Views on Divine Providence (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 13.

[10] S.E. Frost Jr., Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 136.

[11] John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manual Vargas, Four Views on Free Will (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 15.

[12] Lynne Rudder Baker, “Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism,” Nous 42, (2006): 3-4.

[13] Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2000), 273.

[14] Ronald H. Nash, Life’s Ultimate Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1999), 328.

[15] James Porter Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 271.

[16] Norman L. Geisler and Paul D. Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987), 199-200.

[17] Lynne Rudder Baker, “Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism,” Nous 42, (2006): 2.

[18] Ibid., 11-12.

[19] John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manual Vargas, Four Views on Free Will (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 19.

[20] Ibid., 168.

[21] David Basinger and Randall Basinger, ed., Predestination & Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty & Human Freedom (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 25-29.

[22] Paul Kjoss Helseth and Dennis W. Jowers, Four Views on Divine Providence (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 91-94.

[23] Lynne Rudder Baker, “Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism,” Nous 42, (2006): 4.

[24] Kenneth Keathley, Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2010), 8.

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© Adam Lloyd Johnson and Convincing Proof.